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INTRODUCTION

Commentators on the financial and economic crisis of 2007-2008 have
blamed "mark-to-market accounting" for much of the crisis; indeed, one
estimate is that simply relaxing accounting rules on how companies report their
finances to the public could cure "70% of the problem."' The basic argument is
that asset price declines force leveraged entities to sell assets to raise capital and
that these sales push down prices further, forcing more sales and creating a
"downward spiral." 2 The push against mark-to-market accounting led to
political pressure on the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) to revisit these rules.3 This Article argues that mark-to-market accounting
critics did not make their case: the accounting rules they criticize are neither as
inflexible nor as significant as they suggest. 4 The accounting rules did not
rigidly require firms to mark to market, and regulations did not "force" selling
as a result of mark-to-market declines. 5 A review of important failures in the
crisis suggests that none of the firms that collapsed or nearly collapsed did so
because of reporting poor accounting results in their financial statements. 6 The
SEC staff recently reached similar conclusions, and it appears that the agency
7
will not suspend the mark-to-market regime or make sweeping changes to it.
Although the attack on mark-to-market accounting is not persuasive and
may not even be very interesting on its own, it does provide a useful perspective
for examining the role of credit rating agencies in substantive financial
regulation, specifically capital regulation. Financial firms are subject to capital

1. See Newt Gingrich, Suspend Mark-to-Market Now!, FORBES.COM, Sept. 29, 2008,
http://www.forbes.com/2008/09/29/mark-to-market-oped-cx ng_0929gingrich.html (citing BRIAN
S.
WESBURY
&
ROBERT
STEIN,
MARK-TO-MARKET
MAYHEM
2
(2008),
http://www.ftportfolios.com/Commentary/EconomicResearch/2008/9/25/mark-to-market-mayhem
(stating that mark-to-market accounting has caused 70% of the financial crisis without elaborating
on the basis for this quantitative conclusion)); see also William M. Isaac, How to Save the
FinancialSystem, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2008, at A23 (stating that mark-to-market accounting is
the "biggest culprit" in the financial crisis).
2. Gary Gorton, The Panic of 2007, at 65 (Yale Int'l Cen. for Fin., Working Paper No. 0824, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13 /papers.cfm?abstract id- 1255362#; Gingrich,
supra note 1; Peter J. Wallison, Fair Value Accounting: A Critique, 2008 AM. ENTERPRISE INST.
FOR PUB. POL'Y RES. 3-4, http://www.aei.org/docLib/20080728_23336JulyFSOg.pdf
3. See discussion infra Part lI.B.
4. See discussion infra Part lI.C.
5. See discussion infra Part lI.C.
6. See discussion infra Part II.C.3.
7. See SEC STAFF, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 133 OF THE
EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: STUDY ON MARK-TO-MARKET

ACCOUNTING
97,
201
(2008),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/
marktomarket123008.pdf [hereinafter SEC STAFF MARK-TO-MARKET REPORT].
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rules that require them to maintain "cushions" so that they remain solvent if
conditions turn against the firm. 8 Both theory and experience support such rules.
Capital rules incorporate measures of credit risk to reflect the fact that some
debts are more likely to be repaid than others.9 The rules usually allow a firm
that is subject to capital regulation to hold a smaller quantity of capital if its
assets are of high credit quality than if they are of low quality.' 0 Regulators
often use ratings from credit rating agencies, such as Moody's and Standard &
Poor's, as a guide to credit quality." Commentators have widely criticized this
practice, and one of the most cogent and thoughtful critics of rating agencies,
Frank Partnoy, has argued that capital regulators should use "credit spreads"essentially, market prices-instead of ratings. 12We can call this suggestion
"mark-to-market regulation."
However, if capital regulators were to rely solely on market prices instead
of credit ratings, the scenario presented by mark-to-market critics, unpersuasive
under current rules, would be far more plausible. Panic-driven asset price
declines would affect regulatory capital directly. To the extent that regulators
sought to maintain stable capital cushions, they would have to require sales of
capital to meet requirements in conditions of panic selling, and this could
trigger further price declines and more forced selling. To the extent that capital
regulation is going to persist and continue to rely on the quality of individual
assets held by firms, market prices as reflected in credit spreads are a
problematic alternative to credit ratings.
One way of thinking about the problems raised by mark-to-market
regulation is to start from the premise (conventional in financial economics and
risk management) that market prices for financial assets reflect a number of
different risks, including both credit risk and liquidity risk, as well as investors'
willingness to bear each risk (risk aversion). 3 Market prices thus do not directly
tell us about any one risk, such as credit risk. If we want to incorporate a pure
measure of credit risk into regulation, we need something beyond market prices.
We need either a way of isolating credit risk from other factors affecting price,

8. Joseph Jude Norton, Capital Adequacy Standards:A Legitimate Regulatory Concern for
PrudentialSupervision of Banking Activities?, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1299, 1306 (1989).
9. See Camille M. Caesar, Note, Capital-Based Regulation and U.S. Banking Reform, 101
YALE L.J. 1525, 1530 n.36 (1992) (citing Gary Haberman, Capital Requirements of Commercial
and Investment Banks: Contrasts in Regulation, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. Q. REV., Autumn 1987,
at 1, 8) ("Credit risk considerations have dominated the evolution of capital standards in the United
States because banks deal with customers with a range of financial strength .... ").
10. See discussion infra Part ll.B.
11. See discussion infra Part ll.B.
12. See Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of FinancialMarkets?: Two Thumbs Downfor
the CreditRating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 623-24 (1999).
13. See discussion infra Part Ill.D.
14. See discussion infra Part Ill.D.
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or a way of measuring credit risk independently of market price, such as by
analysis of a company's or instrument's expected performance under different
scenarios. That means that we need an intellectual discipline of credit risk
analysis so that there is in principle a role for some entity to perform the
function currently performed by credit rating agencies in capital regulation.
This analysis raises the question, among others, whether we want a pure
measure of credit risk for regulatory purposes. There is a good case for
incorporating such a measure into any capital regulation regime that assesses
risk on an asset-by-asset basis, as all capital regimes known to this author
currently do. 15 For example, current market values are not really relevant for
financial assets that the firm can hold to maturity and will not have to sell. 16
What is relevant for such assets is the likelihood that they will perform as
promised-in other words, credit risk.
There is also a case for replacing asset-by-asset capital regulation with a
system based on market assessments of the value and volatility of the firm's
assets as measured by market values of its stock and debt, as the Financial
Economists Roundtable (FER) has suggested. 17 Such a system could avoid
difficult judgments associated with an asset-by-asset system, such as the need to
assess credit risk for each asset a firm owns, but it would have problems of its
own. The prices of a firm's equity and debt are affected by market factors that
are not directly relevant to its solvency. 18
Although the case for eliminating credit ratings from regulation
undoubtedly has some merit, the consequences for capital regulation of doing so
have not been appreciated. This author would punctuate with a single cheer the
debate that started with "[t]wo thumbs down."
11.

MARK-TO-MARKET FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING IN THE

A.

2007-2008

CRISIS

Fair Value, or Mark-to-Market, FinancialAccounting Rules

Much commentary on mark-to-market (or, more properly, "fair value")
accounting rules obscures the rules' flexibility, history, and significance.

15.
16.

See discussion infra Part V.A.
See discussion infra Part V.A.

17.

See FIN. ECONOMISTS ROUNDTABLE,

STATISTICAL

RATINGS

ORGANIZATIONS

IN

STATEMENT ON REFORMING THE ROLE OF THE
THE

SECURITIZATION

PROCESS

12-13

(2008),

http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/Policy page/FERI 2 1 08rev.pdf [hereinafter FER STATEMENT].
18. See discussion infra Part V.B.
19. Partnoy, supra note 12, at 619.
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Accordingly, it is appropriate to begin with a brief review of what the relevant
20
rules-those governing accounting for financial assets _actually say.
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), which exercises
authority delegated by the SEC to establish accounting rules for the financial
statements of United States public companies, 21 adopted Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 115 (FAS 115) in May 1993, and the provisions of
FAS 115 became "effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15,
1993. "22 FAS 115 establishes three categories of securities and three different
types of accounting treatment as follows:
Debt securities that the enterprise has the positive intent and ability to
hold to maturity are classified as held-to-maturity securities and
reported at amortized cost.
Debt and equity securities that are bought and held principally for the
purpose of selling them in the near term are classified as trading
securities and reported at fair value, with unrealized gains and losses
included in earnings.
Debt and equity securities not classified as either held-to-maturity
securities or trading securities are classified as available-for-sale
securities and reported at fair value, with unrealized gains and losses

20.

The balance sheet must carry financial derivatives at fair value. ACCOUNTING FOR

DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS AND HEDGING ACTIVITIES, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards

No. 133
17, at 9 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1998), available at http://www.fasb.org/
pdf/fas133.pdf. However, changes in the value of derivatives that entities use to hedge other assets
and liabilities affect equity only to the extent that the hedge is ineffective. See id. 22, at 16.
Although changes in the fair value of derivatives that are held for speculation or that ineffectively
hedge other instruments will affect equity, see id., mark-to-market critics did not focus on this
issue and the SEC did not find that it was a factor in the bank failures it reviewed. See SEC STAFF
MARK-TO-MARKET REPORT, supra note 7, at 125-36. Fair value also enters into the accounting of
nonfinancial assets such as property, plant, and equipment held for sale-which must be held at
"the lower of its carrying amount or fair value less cost to sell." ACCOUNTING FOR THE
IMPAIRMENT OR DISPOSAL OF LONG-LIVED ASSETS, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No.

144 34, at 12 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2001), available at http://www.fasb.org/
pdf/fas144.pdf. The mark-to-market controversy did not focus on these rules, and they are not
discussed further here.
21. See Wallison, supra note 2, at 4-5.
22.

ACCOUNTING

FOR

CERTAIN

INVESTMENTS

IN

DEBT AND

EQUITY

SECURITIES,

Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 115 23, at 9 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1993)
[hereinafter FAS 115], available athttp://www.fasb.org/pdf/fasl 15.pdf
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excluded from earnings
and reported in a separate component of
23
shareholders' equity.
There are three critical points here. First, the accounting rules do not require
companies to carry securities at fair value if the owner has the "positive intent
and ability to hold [them] to maturity." 24 Second, these rules affect only how the
securities' values are reported in financial statements. 25 Unless regulations
directly incorporate values from financial accounting statements, the numbers
have only the power that market participants give them. There is nothing in the
accounting rules that requires forced selling. Third, the fair value framework
has been in place for fifteen years, 26 a fact often missing from the contemporary
debate.
The requirement to account for some financial assets at fair value has been
in place for a long time, but there have been recent rules expanding the option to
28
27
account for assets at fair value and specifying how to measure fair value.
Statement of FinancialAccounting Standards No. 159 (FAS 159), adopted in
2007, permits issuers to choose to measure many assets and liabilities at fair
value and to have changes in fair value affect income. 29 The election is made on
an instrument-by-instrument basis and is irrevocable.30 Mark-to-market critics
did not focus on the expansion of issuers' choice to elect fair value accounting,

23. Id.atSummary. Securities that are "other-than-temporar[ily] impair[ed]" are taken out
ofthe three-part framework and "written down to fair value." Id. 16, at6-7. This does not appear
to be a requirement to mark securities to market, as there is no requirement to recognize an
impairment based solely on changes in market price. See EMERGING ISSUES TASK FORCE, FIN.
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ISSUE NO. 99-20, RECOGNITION OF INTEREST INCOME AND
IMPAIRMENT ON PURCHASED BENEFICIAL INTERESTS AND BENEFICIAL INTERESTS THAT
CONTINUE TO BE HELD BY A TRANSFEROR IN SECURITIZED FINANCIAL ASSETS
12(b) (2006),

available athttp://www.fasb.org/pdf/abs99-20.pdf (requiring recognition of impairment of retained
interest in securitizations based on "a holder's best estimate of cash flows that a market participant
would use in determining the current fair value of the beneficial interest," not actual market
prices); SEC STAFF MARK-TO-MARKET REPORT, supra note 7, at30-31.
24. FAS 115, supra note 22, 7, at3.
25. See id. 3,atl.
26. See id. 23, at9.
27. THE FAIR VALUE OPTION FOR FINANCIAL ASSETS AND FINANCIAL LIABILITIES,
Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 159 7 3, (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2007)
[hereinafter FAS 159], available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas159.pdf
28. FAIR VALUE MEASUREMENTS, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 157
5.
(Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2006) [hereinafter FAS 157], available at http://www.fasb.org/

pdf/fas 157.pdf
29. FAS 159, supra note 27, 3.
30. Id. 5. FAS 159 expanded on Statement of FinancialAccounting Standards No. 155,
which permitted issuers to choose to value instruments containing embedded derivatives at fair
value, and Statement of FinancialAccounting Standards No. 156, which did the same for servicing
rights and liabilities.
SEC STAFF MARK-TO-MARKET REPORT, supra note 7, at29 & n.69.
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although such an election led to significant recorded losses at IndyMac Federal
Bank (IndyMac).31
Statement of....
FinancialAccounting Standards No. 157 (FAS 157),
adopted
32
in September 2006, gives guidance on how to measure fair value. It has been
more controversial. FAS 157, which governs financial statements issued for
fiscal years beginning after November 15, 2007, 34 clarifies the meaning of "fair
value." It provides that fair value "is the price that would be received to sell an
asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market
participants at the measurement date." 35 FAS 157 also establishes a three-level
hierarchy for fair values based on the reliability of the inputs that go into the fair
value assessment. 36 The highest level, Level 1, is for "quoted [unadjusted]
prices ... in active markets for identical assets or liabilities." 37 Level 2 inputs
are inputs that are "observable" for the given asset or liability, such as "quoted
prices for similar assets or liabilities in active markets." 38 Level 3 inputs are
"unobservable" inputs for the asset or liability, such as the reporting entity's
own data. 39 This
category apparently includes value estimates generated by
40
internal models.
Although the exact significance of the hierarchy is not entirely clear, as
discussed below, FAS 157 provides that "[v]aluation techniques used to
measure fair value shall maximize the use of observable inputs and minimize
the use of unobservable inputs." 4 1FAS 157 joins the rather vague injunction to
"maximize" one and "minimize" the other with the unhelpful statement that
"[u]nobservable inputs shall be used to measure fair value to the extent that
observable inputs are not available, thereby allowing for situations in which
there is little, if any, market activity ... at the measurement date." 42 That leaves
open the question of what to do if observable inputs are available but require

31. SEC STAFF MARK-TO-MARKET REPORT, supra note 7, at 111, 123-25 (noting that
IndyMac elected fair value accounting for loans held for sale, leading to large losses in 2008).
32. FAS 157, supra note 28, 1.
33. See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, Are Bean Counters to Blame?, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2008,
at C1 (noting that some financial experts blame FAS 157 for "forcing... write-offs and wreaking
havoc on the financial system").
34. FAS 157, supra note 28, 36.
35. Id. 5.
36. Id. 22.
37. Id.
38. Id. 28.
39. Id. 30.
40. See id.
41. Id. 21.
42. Id. 30.
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significant adjustment. 43 The obscurity deepens as we learn that the initial price
at which a company purchases44an asset represents its fair value "in many
cases ...

but not presumptively."

In March 2008, the SEC Division of Corporation Finance sent letters to the
chief financial officers of publicly traded companies setting forth its
interpretation of FAS 157. Somewhat ambiguously, the letter stated,
Fair value assumes the exchange of assets or liabilities in orderly
transactions. Under SFAS 157, it is appropriate for you to consider
actual market prices, or observable inputs, even when the market is less
liquid than historical market volumes, unless those prices are the result
of a forced liquidation or distress sale. Only when actual market prices,
or relevant observable inputs, are not available is it appropriate for you
to use unobservable inputs which reflect your assumptions of what
market participants would use in pricing the asset or liability. Current
market conditions may require you to use valuation models that require
45
significant unobservable inputs for some of your assets and liabilities.
Given that the categories "observable" and "unobservable" exhaust the
universe of possible inputs, the second and third sentences appear to be
contradictory. 46 The SEC seems to mean that unobservable inputs are
appropriate when, and only when, market prices result from "forced
liquidation[s] or distress sale[s]" (where no other "relevant observable inputs"
are available) and that under "[c]urrent market conditions" that circumstance
might obtain.47 However, the meaning is far from clear and the complaint of one
mark-to-market critic that the March 2008 letter "gave no useful guidance
whatsoever to companies or accountants about the effect of market conditions
on asset values" 48 is understandable.
Although FAS 157 and the SEC's March 2008 letter may reflect a
combination of poor drafting, lack of understanding, and timidity on the part of
their authors, these publications undermine the argument that fair value

43. The "Implementation Guidance" accompanying FAS 157 confirms the ambiguity. It
provides that "[a]n adjustment to a Level 2 input that is significant to the fair value measurement in
its entirety might render the measurement a Level 3 measurement, depending on the level in the
fair value hierarchy within which the inputs used to determine the adjustment fall." Id. A24.
44. Id. A26.
45. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, Div. CORP. FIN., SAMPLE LETTER SENT TO PUBLIC
COMPANIES OF MD&A DISCLOSURE REGARDING THE APPLICATION OF SFAS 157 (FAIR VALUE
MEASUREMENTS)
(2008),
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/fairvalueltr0308.htm

(containing an example ofthe letters sent to the chief financial officers).
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. Wallison, supra note 2, at 5.
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accounting rules require marking to market under
all circumstances, including
49
inactive.
and
illiquid
is
market
the
which
in
those
B. The Attack on Mark-to-MarketAccounting and Its Effects
Attacks on mark-to-market accounting have been appearing steadily since
the beginning of the credit crisis in summer 2007, but criticisms accelerated
sharply in August and September of 2008 as concerns about the solvency of
important institutions deepened.50 The basic idea underlying the attack on markto-market accounting is that when a market for a particular asset dries up--for
any reason-that can trigger a "death spiral." 51 Gary Gorton's widely
referenced paper, The Panic of2007, puts it this way:
Marking-to-market... has very real effects because regulatory capital
and capital for rating agency purposes is based on [Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles] (GAAP) .... In the current situation, partly as a
result of GAAP capital declines, banks are selling assets or are
attempting to sell assets - billions of dollars of assets - to "clean up
their balance sheets," raising cash and delevering. This pushes down
prices, and another round of marking down occurs, and so on. 52
The mark-to-market critics prescribed indefinite suspension or termination of
mark-to-market accounting, at least for non-trading financial assets.53
These efforts culminated in the provisions of the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 200854 (EESA), commonly known as the "bailout bill," that

49. At least one critic of mark-to-market accounting acknowledges the flexibility in FAS
157 and blames the SEC staffs interpretation ofthe standard and accountants' aversion to liability
risk for the overly rigid application of mark-to-market. See id. at 4-5. But that supports the
clarification of fair value and mark-to-market rules, not the blanket termination (for available-forsale assets) that Wallison advocates. See id. at 7.
50. See Steve H. Hanke & John A. Tatom, Mark-to-Model, Into the Twilight Zone,
INVESTOR'S BUS. DAILY, Oct. 24, 2008 ("The recent failures of some financial firms have given
new life to arguments against the use of market prices, or mark-to-market accounting.").
51. See Gingrich, supra note .
52. Gorton, supra note 2, at 65; see also Gingrich, supra note I (discussing the "downward
death spiral for financial companies large and small"); Wallison, supra note 2, at 3-4 ("A
downward spiral developed and is still operating."). Neither Gorton nor any ofthe other mark-tomarket critics this author has reviewed provides any support for the assertion that "regulatory
capital .. is based on GAAP." Gorton, supra note 2, at 65.
53. See Gingrich, supra note I (explaining that during suspension "[w]e can take the time to
evaluate mark-to-market all over again"); Isaac, supra note I (arguing for complete termination of
mark-to-market accounting for financial firms); Wallison, supra note 2, at 7 (advocating retention
of mark-to-market for securities held for trading and valuation of securities available for sale at
"the discounted value of their cash flows").
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directed the SEC to "conduct a study on mark-to-market accounting standards"
under FAS 157 and report to Congress in 90 days, 55 and stated that the SEC
"shall have the authority under the securities laws ... to suspend ... the
application of' FAS 157 "for any issuer ...or with respect to any class or
category of transaction." ' 56 The EESA's provision authorizing the SEC to
"suspend" mark-to-market is ironic because the agency already possesses
authority to set accounting standards for public companies in the United States,
and FAS 157's fair value rules reflect the exercise of that power.57 Congress
"authorized" the agency to do what the agency already had power to do.
On September 30, 2008, as the offensive was going on, the SEC and FASB
issued a clarification of the fair value accounting rules under FAS 157.58
Critical points of the clarification are that "[w]hen an active market for a
security does not exist" it is appropriate to "incorporate current market
participant expectations of future cash flows" into valuation, and that this "can,
in appropriate circumstances, include expected cash flows from an asset."59
"Furthermore, when significant adjustments are required to available observable
inputs it may be appropriate to utilize an estimate based primarily on
unobservable inputs." Similarly, "[b]roker quotes may be an input when
measuring fair value, but are not necessarily determinative if an active market
does not exist for the security." 61 Because "[the concept of a fair value
measurement assumes an orderly transaction between market participants," it
follows that "[the results of disorderly transactions are not determinative when
measuring fair value." 62 And "[transactions in inactive markets may
63 be inputs
when measuring fair value, but would likely not be determinative."
The SEC's shift to a very liberal interpretation of FAS 157 seems both
appropriate in light of the fact that market prices have been unavailable for
many assets and sufficient to address legitimate concerns about fair value
accounting's contribution to the crisis. It also seems to mark the outer limit of

54. Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (to be codified at12 U.S.C. § 5201 note).
55. Id.§ 133(a), 122 Star. at3798 (to be codified at12 U.S.C. § 5238).
56. Id.§ 132(a), 122 Star. at3798 (to be codified at12 U.S.C. § 5237).
57. See, e.g.,
Commission Statement of Policy Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a
Designated Private-Sector Standard Setter, Release Nos. 33-8221, 34-47743, 80 SEC Docket 178
(Apr. 25, 2003).
58. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n Office of the Chief Accountant and Fin.
Accounting Standards Bd. Staff, Clarifications on Fair Value Accounting (Sept. 30, 2008),
availableat http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-234.htm [hereinafter SEC Clarification].
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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the SEC's receptiveness to the attack on fair value accounting. The SEC's
staff report concluded that "[e]xisting fair value and mark-to-market
requirements should not be suspended," 65 although it does recommend
improvements to accounting for impairments, further specification of when fair
value should not mean mark-to-market, and further detail• on how 66
exactly to go
about determining and explaining fair value in such circumstances.
C. Mark-to-MarketAccounting Critics Have Failedto Make Their Case
1. Accounting Rules Generally Do Not "Require" Marking to
Market
Many attacks on mark-to-market accounting assert or suggest the flatly
incorrect proposition that marking to market is "required" for financial reporting
of all or most financial assets. 67 In fact, as discussed above, the rules require fair
value accounting only for securities
S• that
68 owners will not hold to maturity,
derivatives, and assets deemed impaired. For example, the rules do not require
fair value accounting for unimpaired loans held to maturity-the most important
asset for most banks. And fair value accounting does not necessarily require
marking to market; the accounting rules provide a good deal of flexibility in
determining fair value.
A more thoughtful critique states that financial institutions are induced to
hold assets in the mark-to-market categories because of "restrictive rules on
when an asset could be considered held to maturity" such as the exclusion from
that category "if the asset might be sold to meet the company's need for
liquidity or if there were changes in funding terms or currency risk."69 Although

64. See, e.g.,
Kara Scannell, Mark-to-Market Likely to Remain, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 8, 2008,
atC2 (stating that the SEC is unlikely to make any more changes to fair value rules).
65. SEC STAFF MARK-TO-MARKET REPORT, supra note 7, at7.
66. Id.at8-10.
67. See, e.g.,
Gingrich, supra note I (stating that fair value accounting "means that
companies must value the assets on their balance sheets based on the latest market indicators of the
price that those assets could be sold for immediately"); Gorton, supra note 2, at63-64 (stating that
FAS 157 "requires that (most) positions be 'marked-to-market' under FASB 157").
68. See discussion supra Part Il.A.
69. Wallison, supra note 2, at 2. Wallison is referring to the following provision in FAS
115:

An enterprise shall not classify a debt security as held-to-maturity if the enterprise has
the intent to hold the security for only an indefinite period. Consequently, a debt security
should not .. be classified as held-to-maturity if the enterprise anticipates that the
security would be available to be sold in response to: ... [n]eeds for liquidity...
[c]hanges in the availability of and the yield on alternative investments ...[c]hanges in
funding sources and terms ...[or c]hanges in foreign currency risk.
FAS H15, supra note 22, 9, at3-4.
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that may be a reason firms chose to hold assets in the fair value categories, it is
not a reason to abandon fair value accounting. If an enterprise must sell an asset
to meet liquidity needs, the asset's value is its market price. It seems difficult to
argue that mark-to-market accounting is inappropriate in this case.
2.

Market Marks Generally Are Not Binding and Do Not Require
ForcedSelling

The attack on mark-to-market accounting seems to focus on commercial
banks. After all, investment banks were required to mark to market for decades,
and these institutions, funded by collateralized short-term lending, were in any
event making it hard to argue that market prices were not true market prices.
But commercial banking regulations generally do not require banks to sell
assets to meet capital requirements just because market values decline.
Although the capital that banks are required to hold for regulatory purposes is
based on accounting capital, it differs in several respects. One such difference is
that bank capital excludes any mark-to-market adjustments to the value of
securities that are available for sale. This is by far the most significant
category of assets that regulations require financial institutions to hold at fair
value.
3. Accounting Losses Did Not Cause Any of the Major Firm Failures
in the Crisis
We can test the hypothesis that FASB's fair value accounting rules were a
major cause of the financial crisis of 2007-2008 by reviewing the most
spectacular failures, bailouts, and forced mergers during that period. If mark-tomarket accounting rules truly accounted for 70% of the financial crisis because
they triggered spirals of forced selling, we would expect to be able to trace at
least some of the major firms' failures to pressure to sell assets to clean up their
balance sheets for accounting purposes. But, in fact, financial firms failed
because (a) trading partners believed that assets proffered to secure lending
were too risky and thus refused to extend financing (investment banks); 7 1 (b)
trading partners demanded collateral to secure underwater trading positions
pursuant to preexisting standard trading agreements (American International
Group (AIG));7 (c) credit rating agencies were about to downgrade or had

70. SEC STAFF MARK-TO-MARKET REPORT, supra note 7, at 115 (citing Regulatory
Capital: Common Stockholders' Equity, 60 Fed. Reg. 42,025, 42,027-28 (Aug. 15, 1995) (codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 567)).
71. See infra text accompanying notes 81-83.
72. See infra text accompanying notes 84-89.
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downgraded the firm (Countrywide Financial Corporation (Countrywide) and
Washington Mutual Bank (Washington Mutual)); 73 (d) regulators believed,
according to their own accounting rules and independent assessment, that a
firm's capital was insufficient for solvency (Federal National Mortgage
Association (Fannie Mae) and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(Freddie Mac)); 74 or (e) regulators believed that the75 company's stock was
getting perilously close to zero value (Citigroup (Citi)).
In no case did fair value accounting rules trigger a firm's failure. In cases
(a) and (b), which reflect the most dramatic and novel situations in this crisis,
financial accounting numbers were not relevant at all. Financial accounting
might have been marginally relevant to case (c) because credit rating agencies
might have incorporated such figures into their analysis. But credit ratings
reflect independent judgment 76 and are not the product of any mechanical test
applied to accounting numbers.77 Firms had the opportunity to explain to rating
agencies
why the accounting numbers did not represent their assets' true
78
value. Case (d) reflects a regulatory judgment about the fundamental solvency
of Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSE) that should not have been based
on market value assessments.
Case
•
•
79(e) seems the closest, because accounting
numbers might affect stock prices, but even here there were no accounting
numbers released at the relevant times. In sum, the lack of connection between
the crisis's biggest flameouts and fair value financial accounting rules suggests
that those rules were unlikely to be responsible for 70% of the crisis. 80 The facts
of each failure are presented in greater detail below.

73.
74.
75.

See infra text accompanying notes 90-94.
See infra text accompanying notes 95-97.
See infra text accompanying notes 98-100.

76. See, e.g.,STANDARD & POOR'S, GUIDE TO CREDIT RATING ESSENTIALS 7 (2009),
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/SPCreditRatingsGuide.pdf
("[B]ecause
rating agencies are not directly involved in capital market transactions, they have come to be

viewed by both investors and issuers as impartial, independent providers of opinions on credit
risk.").
77. Id.atII (noting that "Standard & Poor's reviews a broad range of financial and business
attributes that may influence the issuer's prompt repayment" when forming rating opinions).
78. See
STANDARD
FUNDAMENTALS
OF

&
POOR'S,
STRUCTURED

STRUCTURED
FINANCE

FINANCE
COMMENTARY:
THE
RATINGS
1-2
(2007),

http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/Fundamentals SF Ratings.pdt
79. See Aigbe Akhigbe, Jeff Madura & Anna D. Martin, Accounting Contagion: The Case
of Enron, 29 J. ECON. & FIN. 187, 200 (2005) (noting that "the deflation of a firm's accounting
numbers may cause a reduction in the firm's stock price" and reduce competitors' stock prices).
80. See Gingrich, supra note 1.
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Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. Lehman Brothers Holdings (Lehman)
had to roll over $100 billion a month to finance its investments; 8' such reliance
on short term funding is endemic to investment banks. It failed when its lenders
refused to accept its subprime assets to collateralize further lending.8 2 Although
the details of such decisions are private, it seems unlikely in the extreme that
Lehman's lenders relied on unmodified accounting numbers in making this
decision-especially given that Lehman does not report those numbers
frequently enough to affect the lending decision. This author is aware of no
mark-to-market critic that disputes the overwhelmingly likely scenario: Lehman
argued unsuccessfully to its lenders that its assets had not "really" declined in
value. Accounts of the collapse of The Bear Stearns Companies (Bear Stearns)
tell a similar tale,8 3 and it seems likely that similar considerations led to Merrill
Lynch & Co.'s (Merrill Lynch) agreement to sell to Bank of America and to the
decisions of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley to become bank holding
companies.
AIG. AIG's near-demise is due in part to marking to market but not
necessarily to financial accounting rules having to do with mark-to-market.
Instead, it was the standard financial trading practice of requiring firms to post
collateral on a mark-to-market basis that brought AIG to the brink.8 4 AIG wrote
protection on $57 billion in subprime mortgage-backed assets, and the market
value of this position moved radically against AIG.85 As is standard practice for
trading contracts, the parties on the other side of AIG's trades demanded
collateral to back up AIG's now-existing obligations to them.8 6 This had to do
with the market value of positions and with credit risk mitigation provisions
written into bilateral derivative contracts, not with FASB's mark-to-market
rules for financial contracts.
A credit rating downgrade apparently required AIG to post $15 billion in
additional capital pursuant to its trading agreements, 8 7 and the credit rating
agencies probably incorporated GAAP-based financial ratios into their analyses;
but, as credit rating agencies have consistently asserted over the years, the credit

81.

Steven D. Levitt, Diamond and Kashyap on the Recent Financial Upheavals, N.Y.

TIMES FREAKONOMICS BLOG, Sept. 18, 2008, http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/18/

diamond-and-kashyap-on-the-recent-financial-upheavals.
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. See Michael J. de la Merced & Sharon Otterman, A.I.G. Takes Its Session in Hot Seat,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2008, at B1 (noting that the former AIG chief executive "attributed A.I.G.'s
$25 billion in write-downs to mark-to-market accounting rules, which forced the company to take
paper losses that led to debilitating credit downgrades").
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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rating is an opinion or predictive judgment. 88 Credit rating agencies have no
obligation to use any particular set of ratios or numbers to arrive at their
ratings. 89 FASB and GAAP rules did not prevent the credit rating agencies from
making a judgment that AIG's credit had not actually deteriorated to the point
where a downgrade was warranted.
Countrywide. Amid rumors that Countrywide was on the verge of
bankruptcy, Bank of America announced on January 11, 2008 that it would buy
the company. 90 The immediate issues that caused Countrywide's management
to sell the company reportedly were that Countrywide was at risk of losing its
investment-grade credit rating, that "the eroding value of its assets might force
it to break covenants with bank lenders," and that a "barrage of negative
headlines about its lending practices during the boom ... was damaging the
company's reputation." 9' Again, although lending covenants and rating-agency
models may incorporate financial accounting numbers into their analysis, there
is no reason in principle that they must do so.
Washington Mutual. In the largest bank failure in American history, the
Office of Thrift Supervision seized Washington Mutual from its parent and
placed it into a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) receivership on
September 25, 2008.92 This followed a nine day period in which depositors
withdrew $16 billion from the bank, around 8.5% of total deposits. 93 The run
began on September 15, the day that Lehman filed for bankruptcy protection
and that Standard & Poor's became the last of the three major credit rating
agencies to downgrade
Washington Mutual's credit rating from investment94
grade to junk.

88. See, e.g.,
Legislative Solutions for the Rating Agency Duopoly: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprisesof the H. Comm.
on FinancialServices, 109th Cong. 16 (2005) (statement of Rita M. Bolger, Managing Director
and Associate General Counsel, Standard & Poor's) ("[A]t their core, rating agencies such as
[Standard & Poor's] perform the journalistic activities of gathering information on matters of
public concern, analyzing that information, forming opinions about it,
and broadly disseminating
those opinions to the general public."); STANDARD & POOR'S, supra note 78, at 8 ("Ratings are
merely opinions about the relative likelihood of different future events.").
89. See STANDARD & POOR'S, supra note 76, at11.
90. See Graham Bowley & Gretchen Morgenson, Bank Agrees to Buy Troubled Loan Giant
for $4 Billion, N.Y. TIMES.COM, Jan. 11, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/l/business/
11 cnd-bank.html.

91.

Valerie Bauerlein & James R. Hagerty, Behind Bank of America's Big Gamble, WALL

ST.J.,Jan. 12, 2008, atAl.
92. OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, OTS FACT SHEET ON WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK 3

(2008), http://files.ots.treas.gov/730021 .pdf [hereinafter OTS WaMu Fact Sheet].
93. Id.at1.
94. Ari Levy, WaMu Rating Lowered to Junk by S&P on Mortgage Losses (Update4),
BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 15, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid-20601087&
sid-awDjhtlfoz Q.
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Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's regulator,
the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), placed Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac into conservatorship in early September 2008 because a review had found
that even though the companies had based their assertion that they were
adequately capitalized on a permissible method of computing capital, the better
conclusion was that their capital was not adequate to cover losses on subprime
mortgage securities. 95 Although the extent of unrealized mark-to-market losses
apparently influenced FHFA's judgment, there is no indication that the
regulator considered FASB rules. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were subject to
their own regulatory accounting regime that did not require fair value
accounting. 9 6 In any event, the decision to take them into receivership was
within the regulator's discretion 97 and not mandated by any particular
accounting rule.
Citi. On November 23, 2008, regulators announced that the government
would back $306 billion in Citi loans and securities (with Citi responsible for
the first $29 billion of losses and 10% of losses beyond that) and invest around
$20 billion to purchase Citi preferred stock.9 8 Unlike the other bailouts, the
motive here appears to be explicitly to stabilize the price of Citi's stock, which
had fallen 50% in the preceding week.9 9 To the extent that financial accounting
numbers affect investors, aided by securities analysts, it is possible that markto-market losses could have contributed to stock price declines. But the
immediate cause of the bailout-Citi's 50% decline in the middle of
November-occurred when no new accounting numbers were being reported
and when the SEC's clarification of fair value accounting was in effect. The

95. Dawn Kopecki & Alison Vekshin, Fannie, Freddie Capital Concerns Prompt Paulson
Plan (UpdateD), BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 7, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pidnewsarchive&sid-at2rZoL1 Isw; Levitt, supra note 81.
96. Jonathan Weil, Freddie, Fannie 'Fair Values' Hardly Look Fair, BLOOMBERG.COM,
July 28, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid-20601039&sid-aryKxwWwjlDQ&
refer-home (explaining that GSEs' fair value balance sheets show net asset values "much lower
than what the government lets them show as capital, or what the accounting rules let
them report as
shareholder equity").
97. See Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992, 12 U.S.C.
§ 4617(a) (2000), amended by Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289,
§ 1367, 122 Star. 2654, 2734-36 (2008) (granting the FHFA Director discretion to appoint a
conservator when "assets... are less than .. obligations" or when a GSE is in an "unsafe or
unsound condition to transact business"); FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
ON CONSERVATORSHIP 1, http://www.thfa.gov/webfiles/35/thfaconservqa.pdf(last visited Mar. 19,
2009) (asserting that the FHFA director has discretion to appoint a conservator when a GSE is "in
need of reorganization or rehabilitation of its
affairs").
98. Eric Dash, Citigroup to Halt Dividend and Curb Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2008, at
A].
99. Id.
100. Id.
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attempt to pin Citi's need for a bailout on fair value accounting seems weak at
best.
111. MARK-TO-MARKET REGULATION VS. RATING-DEPENDENT REGULATION

Although fair value financial accounting does not appear to have played the
role in the financial crisis that its detractors assert, the central argument offered
by those detractors-that a liquidity shock could lead to waves of forced selling
and a consequent death spiral-does apply in the ongoing debate over credit
rating agencies. Credit ratings are incorporated into the financial regulatory
system, including capital regulation.' 0' This practice has come under increasing
criticism, and the most important alternative to credit ratings that has been
offered is regulation based on credit spreads-a form of mark-to-market
regulation. If a mark-to-market approach to capital regulation were adopted and
rigidly applied, the death spiral scenario would become plausible, as the
regulator would be forcing asset sales in the event of price declines.
A.

The Purpose of CapitalRegulation

Banks, defined as highly leveraged institutions that borrow with high
liquidity and lend with low liquidity, have a tendency to fail, 0 2 as centuries of
experience have shown. And, since the rise of the modern credit-driven
economy, waves of bank failures have caused serious macroeconomic
problems. 103 This imbues bank soundness with a clear public interest. In
addition, like any firm that is funded partially with equity and partially with
debt, bank owners have an incentive to take excessive risks because their
creditors, including depositors, bear some risk on the downside. Monitoring by
depositors or other creditors may not be sufficient to address this propensity for
excessive risk taking. 104
These issues give rise to capital regulation for banks. In its broadest outline,
the purpose of capital regulation is to ensure that banks maintain a margin of

101. See Rating the Rater: Enron and the Credit Rating Agencies: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 40-43 (2002) (testimony of Isaac C. Hunt Jr.,
Comm'r, United States Securities and Exchange Commission) ("During the past 30 years,
regulators such as the [SEC] have increasingly used credit ratings as a surrogate for the
measurement of risk in assessing investments held by regulated entities.").
102.

See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY ET AL., BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 56-59 (3d

ed. 2001) (outlining briefly the causes and effects of bank runs and panics).
103. See, e.g., FREDERIC S. MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING, AND
FINANCIAL MARKETS 421-22 (8th ed. 2007) (stating that bank panics and the resulting fall in
money supply was "the major contributing factor to the severity of the depression").
104. See id.
at283-84.
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safety-an excess of assets over liabilities-beyond that which they would
maintain on their own. 105 In principle, this margin of safety could apply both to
banks' ability to meet currently maturing obligations (liquidity) and to their
maintenance of positive net worth (solvency).
Other types of financial firms that exhibit perceived problems with
creditors' ability to monitor owners and management also are subject to capital
regulation, even though it has not been as clear that they are as important
systemically as banks. Such institutions include insurance companies
and
securities broker-dealers. 108 Recent events suggest that certain important
trading entities are "[too entangled to fail."' 1 9 To the extent that regulators
adopt "too entangled to fail" as a formal policy, we can expect that such
institutions will become subject to bank-like regulation. Indeed, the important
surviving investment banks have voluntarily embraced such regulation as the
price of gaining access to stable funding. 110 The discussion here is intended to
apply to any institution that, for whatever reason, requires capital regulation.
Although the existence of a public problem does not imply as a matter of
logical necessity that capital regulation is required or that capital regulation
ameliorates the problems of bank failures, there is a broad political consensus
that bank regulation is needed and recent events have strengthened that
consensus. "' Accordingly, I assume that capital regulation of individual

105. See MACEY ET AL., supra note 102, at 277-78.
106. Arguably, commercial banks' ability to borrow from the Federal Reserve obviates
liquidity related capital requirements. However, recent events suggest that this does not address
banks' liquidity needs. See, e.g., Avinash D. Persaud, Regulation, Valuation and Systemic
Liquidity, BANQUE DE FR. FIN. STABILITY REV., Oct. 2008, at 75, 77, available at
http://www.banque-france.fr/gb/publications/telechar/rsf/2008/etud8-l108.pdf ("The marketisation
of banking has been associated with a switch in the role of the central bank from lender of last
resort, to buyer of last resort.").
107. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE §§ 700.01-700.05 (West 2005) (imposing capital
requirements on California insurers).
108. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2008) (specifying minimum capital levels for securities
broker-dealers).
109. See Dwight Jaffee & Mark Perlow, Investment Bank Regulation After the Bear Rescue,
18 CENT. BANKING J. 38, 40 (2008) (stating that the "most critical feature" of the Bear Stearns
crisis arose from the firm's "central role as a principal, market-maker, and dealer in the over-thecounter markets for financial derivatives"); Levitt, supra note 81 ("A reasonable reading of the
recent bailouts suggests a simple rule: if a firm is on the verge of collapse and its ties to the
financial system will lead to a cascade of chaos, the firm will be saved.").
110. Kerry E. Grace, Treasury Will Invest Billions in AmEx, CIT, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24,
2008, at C2.
111. See, e.g., Press Release, Comm'n on Capital Markets Regulation, Recommendations
for Reorganizing the U.S. Financial Regulatory Structure (Jan. 14, 2009), available at
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/CCMR - Recommendations for Reorganizing the US Regulatory
Structure.pdf ("[T]he severity of the crisis, the scope of the regulatory failures and the antiquated,
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institutions will continue, despite the important point that systemic risk caused
by capital market failure may deserve a greater share of attention. 112 1 also
assume that the capital regulator will want to distinguish between assets that are
likely to perform as agreed and those that are not-a point to which I will return
in Part IV.
B. Rating-Dependent CapitalRegulation
Three of the most important classes of entities subject to capital regulation
are banks, securities brokers-dealers (including Wall Street investment banks),
and insurance companies. Credit ratings are included in all three regulatory
regimes, although it is easy to overstate the importance of
credit ratings to
3
regulation of the Wall Street investment banks in particular."
The United States is in the process of making changes to its capital rules for
banks to comply with an international set of standards known as Basel II. Under
current plans for implementing Basel II in the United States, smaller banks will
have a choice between using either the "advanced" or the "standardized"
approach to capital regulation. The standardized approach incorporates credit
ratings into the computation of bank capital115 : A bank must hold more capital if
its assets include $1 million of BB-rated bonds than if its assets include $1
million of AAA-rated bonds. The advanced approach requires banks to devise
their own internal credit rating system, which a bank can use only if the bank

patchwork design of the U.S. regulatory structure have given rise to a broad consensus regarding
the need for sweeping regulatory reorganization.").
112. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 198-204 (2008).
113. Financial regulations other than capital regulation also depend on credit ratings. For
example, SEC rules require money market funds either to mark their holdings to market or to
invest only in securities with high credit ratings, References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized
Statistical
Rating Organizations, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,125 (proposed July 1, 2008) (to be codified at17
C.F.R. pts. 270 & 275), and that structured-finance vehicles issue only securities with high credit
ratings to the public, Id.at 40,127. Other rules designed to limit certain investments to safe
securities, such as rules governing investments of public funds by state governments, also
incorporate credit ratings. See, e.g.,
OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 135.143(A)(6) (LexisNexis 2007)
(stating that the treasurer of the Ohio may invest interim funds of the state in commercial paper if
the "notes are rated at the time of purchase in the two highest categories by two nationally
recognized rating agencies"). Such instances of rating-dependent regulation, which are not
considered in depth here, present different issues from capital regulation.
114. See A Review of Regulatory Proposalson Basel Capitaland Commercial Real Estate:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on FinancialInstitutions and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on
FinancialServices, 109th Cong. 11-13 (2006) (statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation).
115. Seeid.
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satisfies regulators that its risk management system is sophisticated enough to
support that approach. 16
The capital of securities broker-dealers is regulated under SEC Rule 15c31.117 The rule requires broker-dealers to mark to market for regulatory capital
purposes and further requires broker-dealers to take "charges" against their
capital that depend on the credit ratings of the instruments they hold. Notably,
credit ratings are not really used to measure credit risk in this regime, as the
security holdings already are being marked to market, and that marking
presumably reflects the market's assessment of the credit risk of the dealer's
holdings. The credit rating appears to be used as a proxy for a specific kind of
liquidity risk-the risk that the broker-dealer will have to accept less than the
prevailing market price for the instrument ifa quick sale is needed. 119
The SEC apparently did not subject the largest investment bank holding
companies (Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan
Stanley) to meaningful rating-dependent regulation from 2004-2008 even
though their flagship businesses were broker-dealers. These companies were
regulated under a special, voluntary SEC capital regime known as the
Consolidated Supervised Entity (CSE) regime. 120 The CSE regime established
separate capital requirements at the holding company and broker-dealer levels.
At the holding company level, the regime required the ,121
institution to hold capital
computed according to the Basel 11 advanced approach
_-in other words, with
credit risk accounted for by internal credit ratings. At the broker-dealer level,
the regime allowed firms to "utilize mathematical modeling methods already

116. Credit ratings also enter-less extensively-into the determination of bank capital
requirements under the existing "Basel I" approach to bank regulation, which is slated to be phased
out. For example, claims against securities firms under securities lending and repurchase
agreements qualify for favorable capital treatment only if the securities firm and its parent receive
high credit ratings. 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A § 3(a)(2)(xiii)(C)(1)-(2) (2008). The same is true of
positions in asset-backed and mortgage-backed securities and for a class of bank obligations that
includes guarantees and credit-derivative positions. See id.atpt. 3 app. A § 4(a), (d)(1)-(2). Most
other claims against private entities receive the same credit risk weighting regardless of credit
rating under Basel I as implemented in the United States. See id.atpt. 3 app. A § 3(a)(4).
117. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2008).
118. Seeid.
119. Fair value accounting would not capture the effect of this risk as the rules are designed
to record the price that the broker-dealer would realize in "an orderly transaction." FAS 157, supra
note 28, 5.
120. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, SEC'S OVERSIGHT OF
BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED ENTITIES: THE CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISED ENTITY PROGRAM iv

(2008), available at http://www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/Auditsinspections/2008/446-a.pdf [hereinafter
CSE REPORT].
121. Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of
Consolidated Supervised Entities, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,428, 34,429 (June 21, 2004).
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used to manage their own business risk' 22 for capital computations-in other
words, the regime allowed them to mark to model. Firms were also subject to
rules intended to address liquidity risk.123 The CSE regime incorporated credit
ratings in one potentially significant respect. Firms that opted in to the regime
had the option of either having capital charges for counterparty risk in creditderivative transactions calculated based on credit ratings provided by agencies
or using "internal credit ratings" if they could show that their internal risk
management systems were strong enough.
The SEC formally abolished the CSE regime in September 2008125 after all
CSE participants regulated by the SEC 126 had failed (Lehman), been acquired
by large commercial bank holding companies subject to bank capital regulatory
rules administered by the Federal Reserve (Bear Stearns by JPMorgan Chase,
Merrill Lynch by Bank of America), or transformed themselves into bank
holding companies (Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley). 127 The SEC Inspector
General issued a report on September 25, 2008 that criticized the capital and
liquidity provisions of the CSE regime. 128Although the SEC considered
reducing its dependence on credit ratings in its rules, including its capital
regulations for broker-dealers, over the past year, 129 it did not end up doing so,
possibly because
of a desire to leave such a policy change to the new
30
administration. 1

122. Id.at34,428.
123. See CSE REPORT, supra note 120, at14-17.
124. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-le(c)(4)(vi)(D) (2008).
125. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Chairman Cox Announces End of
Consolidated Supervised Entities Program (Sept. 26, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2008/2008-230.htm.
126. Two firms with broker-dealer arms that took part in the CSE program, JPMorgan
Chase and Citi, were not subject to SEC capital regulation because they had another principal
regulator, the Federal Reserve. See CSE REPORT, supra note 120, ativ-v.
127. Id.
128. See id.at 10 ("Bear Stearns was compliant with the CSE program's capital and
liquidity requirements; however, itscollapse raises questions about the adequacy of these
requirements.").
129. Compare References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical
Rating
Organizations 73 Fed. Reg. 40,088, 40,092-94, 40,104-05 (proposed July 11, 2008) (proposing
elimination of reliance on credit ratings in determining broker-dealer net capital), with Press
Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Fact Sheet: Final Rules and Proposed Rules Relating to
Nationally Recognized Statistical
Rating Organizations and Credit Ratings (Dec. 3, 2008),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/nrsrofactsheet-120308.htm (proposing ratingagency reforms but not reforming rules reducing SEC reliance on credit ratings).
130. Kara Scannell, SEC Looks to Limit Rating-Firm Conflicts, WALL ST.J., Nov. 13, 2008,
atC2 (stating that three new commissioners who joined the SEC after promulgation of proposed
rules "have resisted quick action on the more controversial rules" because "[t]hey feel more study
is needed," and the next SEC chairman "may have other priorities").
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State insurance commissioners regulate insurance company capital under
state law.13 1 Apparently, in this scheme, the Securities Valuation Office (SVO)
of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) in large part
discharges responsibility for credit risk. 132 The SVO conducts its own credit
evaluation for regulatory purposes on many debt securities, but it exempts from
SVO filing requirements some securities that have agency ratings. 133 Although
the NAIC has reduced its reliance on rating agencies for municipal bonds as135a
result of the crisis 134 and is considering formation of its own rating agency,
capital regulation of insurers continues to be rating-dependent.
C. Mark-to-Market Regulation Is the Leading Alternative to RatingBased Regulation
Academics have been arguing for a long time that incorporation of credit
ratings into the regulatory system has a bad effect on rating quality and that
regulators should stop relying on credit ratings. Frank Partnoy has been a
leading proponent of this view. 136
Now that poor rating quality is being widely
blamed-at least in part-for the worldwide credit crisis and associated

131. For an early discussion of rating-dependent regulation of insurance, see generally
Partnoy, supra note 12, at 700-01 (examining rating-dependent regulation of insurance
companies).
132. The NAIC is the "organization of insurance regulators from the 50 states, the District
of Columbia and the five U.S. territories." About the NAIC, http://www.naic.org/index about.htm
(last visited Mar. 19, 2009). The SVO describes itself as "responsible for the day-to-day credit
quality assessment and valuation of securities owned by state regulated insurance companies."
NAIC Securities Valuation, http://www.naic.org/svo.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2009).
133.

NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, UNDERSTANDING THE NAIC FILING EXEMPTION (FE)

RULE 1 (2004), http://www.naic.org/documents/svo FE FAQ.pdf
134. See Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs, Rating Reform Benefits Bond Market
(June 1, 2008), available at http://www.naic.org/Releases/2008_docs/ratingreform benefitsbond market.htm (reporting the NAIC's decision, in response to municipal bond insurer
downgrades, to permit the SVO to give municipal bonds higher ratings than those awarded by
rating agencies).
135. See Sam Friedman, Why Shouldn't the NAIC Form ItsOwn Rating Agency?, A VIEW
FROM THE PRESS Box, Oct. 27, 2008, http://property-casualty.com/2008/10/whyshouldnt_
the naic form its.html.
136. See, e.g.,
Frank Parmoy, Second-Order Benefits from Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 169,
181 (2007) ("[T]he government's decision to delegate the certification of products removes some
ofthe reputational constraints on the certification business. The assessing company need not worry
excessively about itsreputation and, consequently, may give certifications to lower quality
products ....); Parmoy, supra note 12, at 622-23 (stating that the "paradox" of "continuing
prosperity of credit rating agencies in the face of declining informational value of ratings" is "best
explained by the practice of linking substantive securities regulation to private credit ratings").
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recession, 37 the idea that rating-dependent regulation corrupts rating quality has
gained traction and many others are taking the same position. 138
It may well be the case that incorporation of credit ratings into financial
regulation harms credit rating quality by artificially propping up demand for
agency ratings and that disentangling the two would lead to higher quality
ratings. But doing so would also leave capital regulators looking for a way to
measure credit risk. A regulator presumably wants to treat a bank's holding of
$1 million face value relatively safe assets such as Treasury bonds differently
from the bank's holding of $1 million in high-yield, or "junk," bonds. Ratingdependent regulation is one way of accomplishing this. The leading alternative
suggestion is Partnoy's-that credit spreads should replace ratings.

137. See, e.g., THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MATTERS, POLICY STATEMENT
ON FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 1 (2008), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/
pwgpolicystatemktturmoil_03122008.pdf (stating that "flaws in credit rating agencies' assessments
of... complex structured credit products" were a "principal underlying cause[] of the turmoil in
financial markets"); TECH. COMM. OF THE INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS, THE ROLE OF CREDIT
RATING AGENCIES IN STRUCTURED FINANCE MARKETS 2 (2008), http://www.iosco.org/
library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD270.pdf ("CRAs and their [credit] ratings played a critical role in
the recent market turmoil."); FIN. STABILITY FORUM, REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY
FORUM
ON
ENHANCING
MARKET
AND INSTITUTIONAL
RESILIENCE
32
(2008),
http://www.fsforum.org/publications/r 0804.pdf ("Poor credit assessments by CRAs contributed
both to the build up to and the unfolding of recent events.").
138. See, e.g., Robert Rosenkranz, Let's Write the Rating Agencies out of Our Law, WALL.
ST. J., Jan 2, 2009, at A15; Taming the Beast: How Far Should Finance Be Re-Regulated?,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 11, 2008, at 6, 14 (stating that the "popular suggestion[]" to reform rating
agencies "will not yield much" because "the problem with credit-rating agencies lies in the tension
between their business model and their use as a regulatory tool"); FER STATEMENT, supra note 17,
at 10 ("The [Financial Economists Roundtable] strongly endorses eliminating from SEC
regulations every prescriptive mandate that is or would be based solely on credit ratings .... ");
Jesse Westbrook & Mark Pittman, SEC May Curb Credit-Rating Conflicts, Delay New Mortgage
Grades, BLOOMBERG.COM, Dec. 2, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid-20601087&
sid-atBFiDUPLir0&refer-home (quoting Christopher Whalen of Institutional Risk Analytics:
"The SEC and Congress need to strip out ofthe federal statute every instance where a pension fund
or a bank is compelled to use ratings" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
139. Partnoy, supra note 12, at 704. A group of academic experts on financial regulation
called the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee made a similar point about the initial proposal
for the Basel 11 Accord in February 2001, arguing that "[a]lthough the task of computing the
correct economic capitalfor a bank is very difficult and complex, bank capital regulation need not
be."
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http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/Policy page/20051114 ShadowStatement169[1].pdf. It asserted
that a "[b]etter [a]pproach" than Basel II's complex computations would simply be to require
banks to "back their assets with a certain minimum percentage of long-term uninsured
subordinated debt," and noted that "[t]he yields on such debt would signal to banks how much risk
the market is willing to tolerate, and to regulators when to intervene and prevent banks from taking
additional risks." Id.
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Credit spreads are inferred from market prices, 14 so regulation based on
credit spreads is in effect the same as regulation based on market prices. In
short, it is a form of mark-to-market regulation.
D. Problems with Mark-to-Market Credit Risk Regulation
The main theoretical weakness of mark-to-market regulation of credit risk
is that prices are not, in principle, a measure of pure credit risk. Market prices
for credit-risky instruments do not depend just on credit risk. They also depend
on factors such as supply and demand, liquidity, and risk aversion. 141 For
example, if prospects for the automotive industry improve, investors may buy
auto bonds and sell tech bonds, even if tech bonds' likelihood of repayment
have not changed. Spreads over the risk-free benchmark for automotive bonds
will tighten and spreads for tech bonds will widen despite the absence of any
change in the actual risk of repayment.
Liquidity refers to the ease with which an asset can be transformed into
cash in the market, and it can affect prices and credit spreads. If for some reason
buyers do not have funds to buy bonds, prices will drop even though there is no
change in the likelihood of repayment. 142Indeed, the plurality view among

140. A credit spread is the incremental yield over the risk-free rate that a credit-risky
instrument offers. See Parmoy, supra note 12, at655. For example, if a Treasury bond (assumed to
be risk-free) is trading ata 3% yield and a corporate bond that is identical except for its
credit risk
is trading ata 5% yield, the credit spread for the bond is 2%. Spreads can be problematic as
measures of credit risk for technical bond-math reasons that I ignore, but the important point is that
because they are defined relative to the risk-free interest rate, they do not change with changes in
the risk-free rate. Changes in the risk-free rate will affect the market price of almost any
nonfloating credit-risky instrument, but they will not affect credit spreads. The discussion that
follows, which equates credit spreads and market prices, should be read as qualified by this
assertion.
141. The idea that market prices reflect the interaction of various objective, discrete risks
with market participants' subjective risk aversion finds support in the risk management and
financial economics literature. See, e.g.,PHILIPPE JORION, VALUE AT RISK: THE NEW
BENCHMARK FOR CONTROLLING MARKET RISK 333-56, 453-90 (3d ed. 2007) (explaining how

recent developments adapt traditional value at risk measures to liquidity risk and credit risk).
Practitioners tend to phrase the point in terms of liquidity and supply and demand rather than risk
aversion. Risk aversion here is used broadly to include "uncertainty aversion"-greater aversion to
poorly understood risks than to well understood ones. See Ricardo J. Caballero & Arvind
Krishnamurthy, Collective Risk Management in a Flight to Quality Episode, 63 J. FIN. 2195, 219697 & n.3 (2008).
142. See, e.g.,
Franklin Allen & Elena Carletti, Should Financial Institutions Mark-toMarket?, BANQUE DE FR. FIN. STABILITY REV., Oct. 2008, at 1, 3, available at
http://www.banque-france.fr/gb/publications/telechar/rsf/2008/etudl
1008.pdf ("[l]n times of
financial crisis the interaction of institutions and markets can lead to situations where prices in
markets do not reflect future payoffs but rather reflect the amount of cash or liquidity available to
buyers in the market.").
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commentators on the 2007-2008 crisis seems to be that liquidity issues
contributed to the dramatic drop in prices for credit-based instruments.
Finally, prices can change due to changes in risk aversion. If investors as a
group decide that they prefer to hold less risky assets, the prices for risky assets
will drop and the prices for safe assets will rise, even if the risky assets have not
become riskier. This phenomenon, sometimes called a "flight to quality," shows
up frequently in financial crises, and observers have used changes in risk
aversion to explain the increase in prices of U.S. Treasurys and the dollar during
the current crisis, 144 as well as the price spike of U.S. Treasurys in 1998 that
famously doomed Long-Term Capital Management. 145
Decreasing market liquidity and an increase in risk aversion 14 6 are widely
viewed as important factors, along with increasing awareness of credit risk, in
the precipitous decline in market prices for almost all credit-risky instruments
over the course of 2007-2008. Disaggregating these components is not a trivial
exercise-indeed, the feasibility of doing so was a central aspect of the debate
over the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 47 and that suggests that it is
highly problematic to rely in any simple way on credit spreads for capital
regulation.
One might argue that all these considerations usually are not very important
and that credit spreads usually are the best measure of credit risk. But even if
this is true, recent experience teaches us that we will find ourselves in situations
where there are significant changes in the latter two factors so that market prices
will not be good guides to the value of held-to-maturity investments. If the
system is going to incorporate pure credit risk, someone needs to translate
market prices to credit risk assessments. Credit rating agencies may well be the
institutions best situated for that role.

143. See, e.g.,
Steven L. Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime FinancialCrisis, 60 S.C.
L. REV. 549, 564 (arguing that the current crisis demonstrates the need for a "market liquidity
provider of last resort").
144. See, e.g.,
David Rodriguez, U.S. Treasury Bill Rates Drop to Lowest Since 1954,
DAILYFX, Sept. 17, 2008, http://www.dailyfx.com/story/topheadline/ExtraordinaryMarket_
Conditions-Dries up-1221664762744.html ("Dramatic declines in [United States Treasury] yields
underline the level of risk aversion in global financial markets, as traders around the world move
their funds into risk-free [United States] government debt. Such dynamics should continue to
support lower-yielding currencies such as the Japanese Yen, which likewise appreciates during
times of financial market risk aversion.").
145. See Caballero & Krishnamurthy, supranote 141, at2196-97.
146. E.g., Wallison, supra note 2, at3-4 ("[C]ontinued withdrawal of financing sources has
compelled the holders of [asset-backed securities] to sell them at distressed or liquidation prices,
even though the underlying cash flows of these portfolios have not necessarily been seriously
diminished.").
147. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 101, 122
Stat. 3765, 3767 (to be codified at12 U.S.C. § 5211) (establishing the TARP).
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E. Alternatives to Rating-Dependent Regulation Other Than Mark-toMarket in an Asset-by-Asset Regime
Assuming the market provides a poor basis for credit risk regulation and
that credit risk regulation is needed does not imply that third party credit rating
agencies should perform the function. For regulatory purposes either the
government itself or regulated parties could assess credit risk.
Some parties have been recommending for some time that the government
itself make the credit risk assessments needed for regulation. 48 One's reaction
to this suggestion is likely to be heavily colored by one's ideological
predisposition. But there does not seem to be much momentum in this direction
currently, perhaps because replicating the credit rating agencies' role is a major
undertaking. 4 9 In any event, the continued reliance on credit ratings in purely
private contexts, such as in trading agreements after the Enron scandals, reflects
market participants' view that private rating agencies have something to offer,
even if their work is flawed.
The Basel II agreement's "advanced" approach, which is now effective for
large banks in the United States, actually incorporates the second idea-credit
assessment by regulated parties-into the financial regulatory system. 150 Even
though regulators ultimately oversee the private parties' rating process, 15 1 this
approach seems to present an obvious conflict of1interest and calls into question
the reason for regulating capital in the first place. 52
In an asset-by-asset risk management regime-a regime in which a firm's
exposure to credit risk is assessed by aggregating the credit risk of the assets it
owns-some measure of assets' pure credit risk is needed, and unadjusted
market prices cannot provide that. Even as the crisis has laid bare the
deficiencies of credit ratings in practice, it has underscored the importance of
well-functioning rating in theory.

148. See, e.g., Lawrence J. White, The Credit Rating Industry: An IndustrialOrgani ation
Analysis, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 41, 41-42,51-57
(Richard M. Levich et al. eds., 2002) (discussing the need for governmental regulatory bodies to
more actively participate in the credit risk assessment process).
149. For example, the SEC recently reported that Standard & Poor's maintains nearly 1.25
million credit ratings. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM., ANNUAL REPORT ON NATIONALLY
RECOGNIZED STATISTICAL RATING ORGANIZATIONS 35 (2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/

divisions/marketreg/ratingagency/nrsroannrep06O8.pdf
150. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. C (2008).
151. See id.
152. Cf Paul Kupiec, Using a Mandatory Subordinated Debt Issuance Requirement to Set
Regulatory Capital Requirements for Bank Credit Risks, in CAPITAL ADEQUACY BEYOND BASEL:
BANKING, SECURITIES, AND INSURANCE 146, 146-48 (Hal S. Scott ed., 2005) (explaining that an
internal ratings approach does not confront the moral hazard incentive created when banks enjoy a
government safety net).
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THE BIGGER PICTURE: SHOULD WE HAVE AN ASSET-BY-ASSET CREDIT
RISK BASED CAPITAL REGULATION REGIME?

A.

Should Asset-by-Asset Capital Regulation Incorporate Pure Credit
Risk?

We can call a capital regulatory regime that measures an institution's
capital by adding up its assets (with appropriate adjustments for credit risk) and
subtracting its liabilities an "asset-by-asset" regime. There are alternatives, as
discussed below, but existing capital regulatory regimes known to this author
work on an asset-by-asset basis. In such a regime, whether an entity should
account for assets at current market value (fair value) or on some other basis
seems to depend on the nature of the regulated entity. Specifically, it depends
on whether the entity's business is likely to require it to liquidate securities
holdings to stay afloat.
A life insurance company or pension fund with the ability and intent to hold
a bond portfolio to maturity to satisfy claims in the distant future is not going to
be impaired by a short-term liquidity-driven drop in the bonds' market value 153
and should not be forced to inject capital because of such an event. If the bonds'
value drops because they become less likely to be repaid, then injecting more
capital would be appropriate. The distinction between credit risk and liquidity
risk is important in this situation; it makes sense to consider the assets' credit
risk in isolation.
The situation is different for a broker-dealer whose business is to hold a
portfolio of securities for sale using a high degree of leverage, with financing
collateralized by the securities themselves. In that case, a decline in price due to
market conditions is highly relevant to the firm's ability to meet its obligations.
The regulatory regime should reflect the exposure to short-term market
fluctuations inherent in the firm's business model, and the firm should react to
them.
Thus, mark-to-market accounting is appropriate for assets that are exposed
to funding liquidity risk; that is, assets that an entity may have to sell or pledge
as collateral to meet funding requirements.1 5 4 But for assets that an entity does

153. For example, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors reported that in
the wake of the liquidity crunch of 2007, reinsurers' exposure was low because assets experiencing
these problems totaled no more than 1% of their portfolios. See NAT'L ASS'N INS. SUPERVISORS,
GLOBAL REINSURANCE

MARKET REPORT 43 (2007), http://www.iaisweb.org/

temp/Global_

Reinsurance Market Report 2007.pdf
154. See, e.g., Persaud, supra note 106 ("One ofthe key lessons ofthe crisis is that a critical
factor in systemic risks is funding liquidity. When the system freezes, those with short-term
funding topple over. Those with long-term funding are the system's stabilisers. They are risk
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not have to sell, market price measures a number of less relevant factors, such
as liquidity risk, and mark-to-market regulation is problematic. 155
B. Should We Drop Asset-by-Asset CapitalRegulation?
Asset-by-asset regulation may not be the best way of setting capital
requirements. The FER recently suggested an alternative in the course of issuing
a sweeping denunciation of the incorporation of credit ratings into bank
regulation. The FER stated that it is "particularly important for banking
regulators to reconsider their reliance on ratings decisions" 5 6 because ratings
exist on an asset-by-asset level and say nothing about how assets interact:
[R]atings may be useful for establishing loss reserves for particular
assets, but they say nothing about how a bank's net worth or its
portfolio of assets may vary in value. The amount of capital that must
be set aside to achieve a particular target level of safety has to be linked
explicitly to measures of the volatility of [the bank's] earnings, not
asset ratings. 157
Using "earnings" as the touchstone, of course, merely displaces the problem
onto the definition of earnings. If earnings is defined so that fluctuations in the
prices of the assets owned by the bank directly flow through to earnings, then
the bank's capital requirement will fluctuate because of irrelevant factors such
as liquidity problems in markets
for assets that the bank is unlikely to have to
8
sell, as explained above. 15
This argument implies that credit ratings are incomplete, not necessarily
that they are useless. The basic point is that credit ratings, when incorporated

absorbers. However, by using common mark-to-market accounting, valuation and risk rules we do
not make any distinctions between those with a funding liquidity issue and those without.").
155. Id. at77-78.
156. FER STATEMENT, supra note 17, at 12.
157. Id. at 13.
158. See discussion supra Part Il.D.
159. The same point applies to the Roundtable's argument that credit ratings "convey no
information about the volatility of an asset's return around expected loss experience," which makes
them unsuitable for setting capital requirements because such requirements "are intended to
provide a buffer against unexpected risks"-expected losses, the ones to which agency ratings
might provide a clue, are the province of "loss reserves." FER STATEMENT, supra note 17, at 1213. This objection at most identifies a limitation on the agencies' existing methods for performing
credit risk analysis. It does not imply that regulators should disregard credit risk or that an entity
other than a specialized private third party entity should analyze it. There is no reason, in principle,
to suppose that credit rating agencies could not attempt to provide loss distribution information.
Moreover, mark-to-market regulation is not necessarily an improvement. Market prices for assets
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into asset-by-asset regulation, do not take into account the interactions
(correlations) among the fluctuations in value of a firm's various assets and
liabilities, hence the reference to "portfolios." Information about the risk of
individual credits can be incorporated into an interaction model; indeed, there is
a highly
160 developed discipline of portfolio construction that is designed to do just
that.
To the extent that earnings are derived from fluctuations in market
prices, the fact that market prices for assets fluctuate for market factors having
nothing to do with the likelihood that obligations will be repaid is a problem.
Despite the fact that setting capital requirements based on the earnings
volatility of the firm as a whole presents many difficulties, it is worth exploring.
Given that this approach would be a radical change in the way capital
calculations are done, there is a strong reason to believe that it will not come
into effect for many years. In the interim, it is worth trying to improve the
performance of the system we have.
V.

CONCLUSION

In a capital regulation system for financial firms that generally resembles
our current one (where risk is determined on an asset-by-asset basis), there is a
good case for incorporating a pure measure of credit risk into the regulatory
regime. Recent events have not shown that we should get rid of mark-to-market
accounting, but they have highlighted the fact that market prices reflect factors
other than credit risk so that using them as a pure measure of credit risk is
problematic. It is worthwhile to consider alternatives to asset-by-asset
regulation; however, the alternatives have their own problems. In the meantime,
financial regulation should incorporate the function that credit rating agencies
are supposed to perform, and there is at least a decent case that independent

at a given time do not in themselves provide any estimate-with or without information about
volatility-of pure credit losses. See discussion supra Part IlI.D. One could try to extract volatility
information from a historical time series, but that assumes that past experience forecasts the future,
a dangerous assumption in a crisis. Although derivative prices may in theory provide evidence of
the market's expectations for volatility, see SALIH N. NEFTCI, PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL
ENGINEERING 429 (2004), efforts to extract volatility information from market prices depend
heavily on theoretical assumptions and are vulnerable to market disruptions and technical factors,
see id. at 431. For example, one cannot simply extract a single market estimate of volatility from
option prices using the Black-Scholes model, because market prices and the model usually imply
several different values for a given firm's stock at any given time. See id. at 435 ("[O]ptions that
are identical in every respect, except for their strike, in general have different implied
volatilities.").
160. RICHARD C. GRINOLD & RONALD N. KAHN, ACTIVE PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT: A
QUANTITATIVE APPROACH FOR PROVIDING SUPERIOR RETURNS AND CONTROLLING RISK 194-97
(2d ed. 2000) (detailing the process for constructing "factor models" of asset risk and combining
them with beliefs about asset returns to build optimal portfolios).
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third party agencies should perform the function. The attention that regulators
and scholars are now paying to rating agency performance is warranted.
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